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Introduction
What degree o f power do municipalities exercise in the regulation o f environmental 
matters within their borders? Should they be permitted to pass environmental 
by-laws which overlap with or even supersede federal and provincial environmental 
laws? Are municipalities even equipped to legislate in such a complex area? These 
questions are interesting to consider in light o f the decision by the Supreme Court 
o f Canada in 114957 Canada Ltée. (Spraytech, Société d ’arrosage) v. Hudson 
(Town)}
In short, the Supreme Court concluded that the Town of Hudson had the 
authority to pass a by-law controlling the use of pesticides, essentially banning their 
use for aesthetic purposes. Despite the fact that both the federal and provincial 
governments had already passed comprehensive legislation governing the licensing 
and use o f pesticides and the Town o f Hudson had no specific, express authority 
under the provincial municipal act to pass such a by-law, the Supreme Court upheld 
the validity o f the by-law. It did so on the basis that the Town had a discretionary 
authority to regulate pesticides in this manner.
The majority o f the Supreme Court proceeded to find additional support for the 
by-law based on the international law concept o f the “precautionary principle.” This 
principle states that where there is a threat o f serious or irreversible damage to the 
environment, a lack o f full scientific certainty should not be used as a bar to the 
pursuit o f measures that would prevent harm to the environment. This is the portion 
o f the decision that could have the greatest impact, particularly if the provinces do 
not control municipalities attempting to pass by-laws and regulations over 
environmental matters.
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The decision in Hudson has arguably opened the door for municipalities to begin 
actively regulating other matters relating to the environment, even where such 
matters are beyond the scope of a municipal council’s expertise. As we will discuss 
below, the Court’s expansion of a municipality’s discretion to pass by-laws, 
combined with its recognition of the “precautionary principle” as justification for 
municipalities to take preventative action, could lead to attempts by municipalities 
to attempt a broader regulation of environmental matters within their borders. This 
is cause for concern given that municipalities, though perhaps in touch with the 
environmental concerns of local residents, will likely lack the necessary experience 
and resources to deal with these matters. Relying on Hudson, a municipality may 
simply invoke the precautionary principle and argue that, even though there may not 
be scientific evidence that harm will be caused by a particular activity or substance, 
it is necessary to pass a by-law in order to prevent possible harm. As a result, 
legitimate efforts by the scientific community to determine whether substances or 
activities are harmful could be put aside in the name o f the precautionary principle. 
In our view, this would represent a major step backward for the effective 
environmental regulation of Canadian industry and is inconsistent with developing 
trends in environmental law, including the concept o f sustainable development.
An Overview of Municipal Power
As a federal state, the power to legislate in Canada is divided between two separate 
levels o f government: the federal Parliament and the provincial legislatures.2 The 
power to incorporate municipalities is exclusively provincial; under s.92(8) of the 
Constitution, the provinces are granted the authority to pass laws in respect of 
“municipal institutions in the province.” To this end, most provincial legislatures 
have enacted statutes, usually entitled the “Municipal Act,” which provide for the 
framework, formation and operation of municipal governments. To incorporate a 
specific municipality, a province would also pass an individual statute, such as the 
City o f  Toronto Act. These individual statutes, combined with a province’s general 
municipal act, are known collectively as a municipality’s “enabling legislation.”
Thus, municipalities are purely creations of provincial legislation. As such, they 
may only exercise those powers that are specifically delegated to them by the 
province. However, the provinces may only delegate those powers that they are 
themselves entitled to exercise under the Constitution. Thus, provincial legislation
- Constitution Act. 1867 (U.K.), 30 and 31 Viet., c. 3.. reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5,. 91 and 
92.
that purports to delegate powers that offend the federal-provincial division of 
powers, and the municipal by-laws passed pursuant to those purportedly delegated 
powers, are ultra vires and thus of no force or effect.
Furthermore, as municipalities are creatures o f statute, they possess no inherent 
authority. They are only entitled to exercise those powers that have been expressly 
conferred upon them by the province. Consequently, they cannot exercise their 
authority in a way that conflicts with provincial legislation. Municipal initiatives 
that exceed the authority granted by their enabling legislation, or that conflict with 
other provincial legislation, will also be invalidated as being ultra vires the authority 
of the municipality.
The Delegation of Municipal Power
Generally speaking, a municipality’s authority to pass by-laws is derived from two 
types o f provisions in provincial enabling legislation. First, municipal acts include 
a large number o f detailed provisions granting municipalities the authority to pass 
by-laws on specified subject matters, such as the creation of bicycle paths or the 
restriction of smoking in public places. Second, municipal acts also include a 
“general welfare provision,” which grants municipalities an overriding power to 
enact by-laws for broad, discretionary purposes. For example, the general welfare 
provision of the Ontario Municipal Act provides as follows:
Every council may pass such by-laws and make such regulations for the health, 
safety, morality and welfare o f the inhabitants o f the municipality in matters not 
specifically provided for by this Act and for governing the conduct o f its members 
as may be deemed expedient and are not contrary to law.3
In the Hudson case, a similar general welfare provision was relied on to pass the 
by-law restricting pesticide use. Section 410(1 ) o f Quebec’s Cities and Towns Act 
states that “the council may make by-laws: to secure peace, order, good government, 
health and general welfare in the territory of the municipality.”4
Given the specific nature of by-law provisions which inform a municipality of 
what it may pass, it is not surprising that municipalities have tried on several
3 Municipal Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.45, s. 102.
4 Cities and Towns Act, R.S.Q. c. C -19, s. 410( 1 ).
occasions to expand their powers by passing by-laws under the umbrella of 
discretionary authority granted in a general welfare provision. Such attempts, 
however, have historically been met with limited success.
The Scope of General Welfare Provisions
General welfare provisions are, by their nature, broad and intentionally vague. 
Consequently, the courts have often been called upon to determine what a general 
welfare provision means, and how much power it actually confers on a municipal 
council. If  a by-law which is not expressly authorized by a specific provision is 
found to be outside the scope of the general welfare power, the by-law will be 
deemed to be invalid.
In 1993, the Supreme Court o f Canada considered the scope of the Ontario 
general welfare power in two concurrent judgements: R. v. Sharma5 and R. v. 
Greenbaum.6 In each case, a street vendor had been convicted of offering goods for 
sale on a street without a licence, contrary to a Toronto municipal by-law. The street 
vendors successfully appealed their convictions on the grounds that the relevant 
by-law was ultra vires the power o f the municipality as it was not specifically 
authorized by the Municipal Act.
In reaching their decisions, the Court considered three specific by-law provisions 
that granted the City authority to regulate street vending which were ultimately 
found not to authorize the impugned by-law. The Court also considered the general 
welfare provision that granted power to regulate for the “health, safety, morality and 
welfare” o f the City. The Court held that the general welfare power could not be a 
source o f authority for a by-law that dealt with any subject matter already addressed 
by specific by-law provisions, and thus the by-law was deemed ultra vires.
Although the Supreme Court o f Canada did not state that general welfare 
provisions could never be a source o f municipal authority, their usefulness to 
municipalities was obviously restricted by these decisions. Where there are specific 
by-law provisions in a municipality’s enabling legislation that relate to the same 
subject matter as an impugned by-law, the very existence of the specific provisions 
will prevent recourse to the general welfare provision as a source o f authority. The 
specific by-law provisions are held to represent the full extent o f a municipality’s
5 [1993] 1 S.C.R. 650.
6 [1993] 1 S.C.R. 674.
authority to legislate in that area.
Nevertheless, general welfare clauses have been accepted as a source of 
municipal jurisdiction in cases where no specific power is given in relation to the 
same subject matter in the enabling legislation and the by-law falls within the 
general welfare power.7 This was the situation in the Hudson case.
The Hudson Case
In Hudson, the Supreme Court considered whether a municipality had the authority 
to pass a by-law effectively banning the use o f pesticides for aesthetic purposes. In 
1991, the Town had adopted By-law 270, which restricted the use of pesticides to 
specified locations and for enumerated activities. This by-law was passed by the 
Town’s council in response to years of residents’ concerns over pesticide use.
The appellants were landscaping and lawn-care companies operating in the 
municipality. In the course o f their business, they regularly used pesticides approved 
under the federal Pest Control Products A cf  and held the necessary licences under 
the provincial Pesticides Act.9 The appellants were charged with violating By-law 
270. A suspension of proceedings before the Municipal Court was granted to allow 
the appellants to bring a motion before the Superior Court to have the by-law 
declared inoperative and ultra vires the town’s authority. The by-law was upheld as 
valid by both the Superior Court and, on appeal, by the Quebec Court o f Appeal. 
The appellants consequently took the appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.
Madame Justice L ’Heureux-Dubé, writing for the majority and dismissing the 
appeal, considered two issues. Firstly, did the Town have the statutory authority to 
enact By-law 270? Secondly, even if the Town had the authority to enact it, was 
By-law 270 rendered inoperative because of a conflict with federal or provincial 
legislation?
With respect to the first issue, the Supreme Court held that By-law 270 fell 
squarely within the “health” component o f the general welfare provision, as the 
purpose of the by-law was to minimize the use of allegedly harmful pesticides.
7 See Ward v. Edmonton (City), [1932] 3 W.W.R. 451 (Alta. S.C.).
8 Pest Control Products Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-9.
9 Pesticides Act, R.S.Q. c. P-9.3.
Since there was no specific provision in the enabling legislation governing pesticide 
use, and the by-law did not represent a complete ban o f pesticides (which the Court 
would have found to be unlawful), By-law 270 was found to be a valid exercise of 
the municipality’s general power to regulate for the good of the community.
In response to the second issue, the Court determined that the by-law was not 
rendered inoperative as there was no direct conflict between the by-law and any 
federal or provincial legislation. In order to be found inoperative, there must be an 
express contradiction between legislation such as where one law says “yes” and the 
other says “no.” In this case, both the federal and provincial legislation were found 
to be permissive, rather than exhaustive, and the Court found no barrier to dual 
compliance. In addition, there was no evidence that the provincial legislature had 
intended to preclude the regulation o f pesticides at the municipal level.
The Hudson case may give new life to municipalities’ ability to legislate for the 
“general welfare” o f the community, and undoubtedly expands municipal discretion 
to regulate environmental matters. However, the Supreme Court recognized that this 
discretionary authority is not without restrictions. Such provisions, the Court said, 
do not confer unlimited power on municipalities, nor can they provide a basis for 
enacting by-laws with ulterior objectives. Nevertheless, these concerns may 
materialize over the next several years as municipalities test the limits o f their 
authority following the Hudson decision.
Can (and Should) Municipalities Regulate Environment Matters?
The decision in Hudson has arguably opened the door for municipalities to begin 
more active regulation of environmental matters within their borders. Through 
reliance on a general welfare power, a municipality may have authority to pass 
by-laws imposing stringent environmental requirements or standards, subject to 
direct conflict with existing provincial or federal legislation. We submit, though, that 
this was not the intention o f provincial governments when discretionary authority 
was granted to municipalities under general welfare provisions.
General welfare provisions provide municipalities with the ability to pass 
necessary by-laws that have not been contemplated in advance by the provincial 
legislature. This “back up” jurisdiction is not, in our view, meant to be used as a 
primary source o f power. The general welfare provisions are a reasonable delegation 
by the provincial governments, as it would be impossible to predict the incidental 
powers a municipality might require to govern effectively. However, it is untenable 
to suggest that environmental regulation was not contemplated by the provinces
when delegating authority to municipalities. It is more probable that municipalities 
were intentionally not granted wider, specific powers to regulate environmental 
matters. Provincial governments likely recognized that environmental issues should 
be dealt with on a provincial level, not by each municipality in a patchwork manner. 
General welfare provisions, like all municipal by-law powers, are intended to enable 
municipalities to address community specific issues, not those which are already 
regulated at the provincial or federal level.10
In Hudson, the Supreme Court proposed that “whatever rules o f construction are 
applied, they must not be used to usurp the legitimate role o f municipal bodies as 
community representatives.” While we agree that it is a legitimate function of 
municipal councils to represent the interests o f the community, this role must be 
confined to addressing local issues, specific to those residents for whom the council 
is responsible. We submit that granting municipalities the ability to impose specific 
environmental requirements or standards goes beyond the scope o f local community 
representation.
Even if municipalities have the power to regulate environmental matters, should 
they? In our view, there are a number o f reasons why municipalities should not 
attempt to regulate environmental matters, with the exception o f the involvement 
they would have during the re-zoning or redevelopment o f property.
If  municipalities decide to regulate environmental matters involving businesses 
and their practices, we can see a number o f difficulties that may arise. 
Municipalities that are unsophisticated or have insufficient resources to deal with 
environmental matters may simply decide to invoke the precautionary principle 
without regard to sound scientific evidence. This is particularly important given the 
fact that a by-law such as the one passed by the Town o f Hudson can have a very 
significant impact on the operations of local businesses. For example, we can 
predict that the appellants in the Hudson case, despite compliance with all federal 
and provincial legislation will suffer significant hardship as a result o f their inability 
to apply pesticides in the treatment of residential lawns and gardens.
One might question why that is a problem, given the concerns raised by residents 
about these practices. The Town of Hudson, like most municipalities, would not 
likely have had sufficient information, knowledge or resources to properly determine 
whether the appellants’ activities actually posed a threat. Such matters are carefully
10 See Shell Canada Products Ltd. v. Vancouver City, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 231
studied by experts and comprehensively regulated by both the federal and provincial 
governments. Unfortunately, the precautionary principle may allow municipalities 
to regulate without a similar regard for good science.
Furthermore, it is arguably more effective to regulate environmental matters on 
a national or even international scope, as opposed to regulation on a local basis. O f 
course, contamination o f the air, soil and water does not respect municipal or 
provincial borders. To ensure there is sufficient certainty and fairness, 
environmental requirements and standards should be imposed at the provincial and 
in some cases, national level.
A municipality might argue that it should be entitled to impose an even stricter 
standard at the municipal level because of the particular and unique concerns o f its 
local residents. This could cause businesses to establish or relocate themselves 
outside that municipality. In our view, to avoid a “race” to the bottom where 
companies would seek out municipalities with weaker laws, it makes better sense to 
have environmental requirements and standards established at the provincial level. 
That is where the most resources are available, and can be applied in a fair and 
meaningful way to protect the environment and the citizens of the province.
It would be difficult, if not impossible, for industry to operate provincially or 
nationally where there is a patchwork of environmental legislation adopted by 
various municipalities. Rather than having a multitude o f municipalities determining 
whether a substance or undertaking is harmful to the environment and requires 
regulation, one agency can do the job much more effectively at the provincial level. 
Indeed, the ability of a provincial government to regulate intra-provincial 
environmental matters was recognized in the Constitution. Provinces are granted the 
ability to regulate matters involving property rights, as well as matters o f local 
concern, which would encompass environmental matters impacting health and 
property rights within the province.
The economic impact o f the Hudson decision does not stop at the Quebec 
pesticide industry. It is entirely possible that other types of businesses will be 
targeted. Non-governmental organizations have already begun to speculate on the 
possible future applications o f the reasoning in Hudson. For example, the Sierra 
Club of Canada has posted on its website sample pesticide by-laws for every 
Canadian province. In addition, the Sierra Club’s website provides an example of 
how broadly the decision might be interpreted:
This decision goes farther than simply upholding Hudson’s by-laws, however.
It points out that the relevant pieces o f legislation in other provinces have wording 
that is comparable, with the implication that correctly-worded bylaws enjoy the 
same interpretation. In addition, while upholding the right o f municipalities to 
protect the health o f their residents against environmental threats, th ere  is no  ex p lic it 
m en tion  o f  p e s tic id e s , which o p en s up the p o te n tia l f o r  b y la w s p ro h ib itin g  o r  
res tr ic tin g  o th e r  a c tiv itie s  o r  su bsta n ces (M O X  p lu ton iu m  sh ipm en ts, g m o ’s, 
d iox in ?) in co m m u n ities .11 [emphasis added]
Our concerns are more than hypothetical. Since the original by-law was passed 
by Hudson in 1991,36 municipalities in Quebec have passed similar by-laws. Other 
provinces have also followed suit. Halifax has passed a by-law banning the aesthetic 
use o f pesticides and several Ontario municipalities have approved differing levels 
o f pesticide bans.
These are but a few of the concerns raised by the Hudson decision. These 
potential impacts will be further compounded if municipalities are entitled to rely on 
the precautionary principle as the Court did in Hudson.
The Impact of the Precautionary Principle
The precautionary principle (sometimes referred to as the precautionary approach) 
is a concept which has evolved primarily through international law. It first gained 
prominence through its inclusion in the Rio Declaration on the Environment and 
Development.12 Principle 15 o f the Rio Declaration stated:
... in order to protect the environment, the Precautionary approach shall be widely 
applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats o f serious 
or irreversible damage, lack o f full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason 
for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.
Prior to the Hudson decision, the precautionary principle had only been 
mentioned sporadically by Canadian courts and had never directly formed part o f the
11 The Sierra Club o f Canada, online: <www.sierraclub.ca/national/pest/pesticide-bylaws/>.
12 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Rio Declaration), 14 June 1992, U.N. 
Doc. A/Conf. 151/51 Rev. 1,31 I.L.M. 876.
basis for a judgement.13 It had generally been considered in the context o f 
international treaties and national environmental policies. In Hudson, however, the 
Supreme Court not only recognized the precautionary principle as a valid 
interpretative tool, but applied it to justify legislative action at the municipal level.
The precautionary principle is not yet an established legal concept, and is quite 
controversial in its scope and application. For instance, there is debate whether the 
precautionary principle might automatically create a positive legal duty to act in the 
face o f a serious environmental threat. At the international level, there is 
disagreement over the level o f harm required to trigger the precautionary principle, 
the best way to translate the threshold into an operationally meaningful standard,14 
and the scope o f activities that should be covered by the principle.15 By importing 
the precautionary principle into municipal law, the Supreme Court has granted 
municipalities a legislative tool that neither provincial, federal nor even international 
governments have entirely mastered.
The federal government is currently seeking comments on a discussion paper, 
entitled “A Canadian Perspective on the Precautionary Approach/Principle, ” which 
was released in September 2001. This discussion paper proposes a system of 
guiding principles to apply the precautionary principle in a consistent manner across 
Canada. The paper outlines six general principles o f application:
1. the precautionary approach is a legitimate and distinctive decision making 
tool within risk management;
2. it is legitimate for decisions to be guided by society’s chosen level of 
protection against risk;
3. sound scientific information and evaluation must be the basis fo r  applying 
this precautionary’ approach, particularly with regard to
(i) the decision to act or not to act, and
13 See Canadian Environmental Law Association v. Canada (Minister o f  the Environment) (T.D.),[ 1999]
3 F.C. No. 564; River Road Action Team \. New Brunswick (Minister ofthe Environment),[\997] N.B.J. 
No. 126, online: QL ( W WR); 611428 Ontario Ltd. v. Metropolitan Toronto and Regional Conversation 
Authority, [1996] O.J. No. 1392, online: QL (WWR).
14 J. Moffet, “Legislative Options for Implementing the Precautionary Principle” ( 1997) 7 J.E.L.P. 157 
at 160.
h D. VanderZwaag, “The Precautionary Principle in Environmental Law and Policy: Exclusive Rhetoric 
and First Embraces” ( 1998) 8 J.E.L.P. 355 at 360.
(ii) the measures taken once the decision is made;
4. the scientific evidence required should be established relative to the chosen 
level o f protection. Further, the responsibility for producing the information 
base or burden o f proof may be assigned. It is recognized that the scientific 
information base and responsibility for producing it may shift as the 
knowledge evolves;
5. mechanisms should exist for re-evaluating the basis for the decision and for 
providing the transparent process for further consultation;
6. a  greater degree of transparency, clearer accountability and increased public 
involvement are appropriate.
The discussion paper also suggests ongoing requirements for governments that 
pass preventative legislation which rely on the principle. Such requirements would 
include the continued monitoring o f new scientific evidence to determine whether 
a regulation is still justified.
We submit that the implementation o f the precautionary principle in a manner 
consistent with the proposed federal principles is beyond the ability and resources 
o f individual municipalities. A thorough understanding of the existing scientific 
evidence, or the reasons for a lack o f evidence, is a prerequisite for the proper 
application o f the precautionary principle. Furthermore, it is necessary for the body 
applying the principle to have the resources needed to continually monitor new 
scientific information to and determine whether the preventative regulation is still 
relevant. A municipality that purports to take preventative action consistent with the 
precautionary principle will likely do so only at a superficial level.
This does not imply that municipal governments are incapable of effectively 
governing their local communities. However, we submit that an effective 
implementation o f the precautionary principle would require an experienced and 
informed regulatory agency to administer a comprehensive environmental 
framework that incorporates established environmental policies. This form of 
administration is beyond the scope o f a municipal council’s expertise and is far more 
appropriate for an experienced environmental agency, such as the Provincial 
Ministries of the Environment.
Conclusion
Surprisingly, provincial governments do not appear to be making attempts to reign 
in the municipal discretion to pass by-laws. In fact, the exact opposite has occurred 
in at least two jurisdictions. In Alberta and Ontario, the provincial governments have 
granted or are in the process o f granting municipalities “natural person” powers. 
Such powers enable municipalities to take action even where they are not expressly 
authorized to do so by their enabling legislation. Municipal corporations that 
possess natural person powers may exercise any right, privilege or power enjoyed 
by a natural person, except where prohibited or limited by statute. The ability of a 
municipality to pass a by-law governing environmental matters appears very broad 
indeed when such natural person powers are combined with the decision in Hudson.
The extent to which municipalities will step into the environmental regulatory 
arena remains to be seen. The impact o f the Supreme Court’s decision in Hudson 
and the acceptance o f the precautionary principle as a legitimate legislative tool, may 
only be determined when the next municipality attempts to pass environmental 
legislation pursuant to its general welfare provision. The courts will then have to 
determine whether Hudson should be restricted to its facts, or whether it is only the 
beginning o f an expanded municipal role in environmental regulation. In our view, 
the Supreme Court’s acceptance o f the precautionary principle for use by 
municipalities has the potential to open a Pandora’s box that will only be closed 
when provincial governments restrict the powers available to municipalities. 
Unfortunately, this restriction may cause the pendulum to swing too far in the 
opposite direction. The result would be a situation where municipalities would lose 
the incidental powers necessary to deal with local matters for the benefit o f their 
constituents.
